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I 
We usually suppose there is something special about the law of 
the Constitution. We assume that we can identify and define consti-
tutional law in a way which sets it apart from all other law, the 
"ordinary law," in the legal system. The institution of constitu-
tional judicial review is premised on that identifiably separate char-
acter: the power of courts is a result of their role as the executors of 
this special law which can be distinguished from the mere ordinary 
law with which it may come into conflict. The distinction is funda-
mental in Marbury v. Madison where Chief Justice Marshall de-
clared that "[t]he Constitution is either a superior, paramount law 
... or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts .... "1 It is the 
essence of what, Marshall said, "we have deemed the greatest im-
provement on political institutions"-a written Constitution.2 
Most obviously, the Constitution is different insofar as it occu-
pies a distinct and higher place in the legal hierarchy. But it has 
generally been thought to be different, as well, with respect to the 
subjects it governs. Lawyers have never thought it to be a law for 
every grievance and every dispute. If it were, it would be coexten-
sive with ordinary law and, while its status as superior law is not 
logically inconsistent with such coverage, its very ubiquity would 
rob it of the special regard which accounts, in part, for its critical 
impact on the legal and political system. 
As an abstract matter, it would be possible to define the special 
sphere of constitutional application in any of a number of ways. As 
a matter of constitutional history, however, one criterion has played 
• William J. Brennan Professor of Law, University of Connecticut. I am grateful for 
the useful critical comments on prior drafts by Anne Dailey, Jeremy Paul and Carol 
Weisbrod. 
I. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
2. ld. at 178. 
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the central role: the idea that the Constitution is especially con-
cerned with the limitation of "public" power and, by the same to-
ken, that it is not ordinarily concerned with the regulation of other, 
"private," sources of power. For at least the last twenty-five years 
this "essential dichotomy"3 has been the subject of a powerful aca-
demic critique. The dissolution of a meaningful public-private dis-
tinction, however, threatens the distinction between constitutional 
and ordinary law. If that prospect is a troubling one, it may be 
worthwhile to reconsider whether some form of the public-private 
distinction in constitutional law might be worth salvaging. That is 
what I attempt to do in this essay. 
• • • 
The distinction between public and private manifests itself in 
several difficult and intensely contested questions of constitutional 
adjudication. Most directly relevant is the reach of the "state ac-
tion" doctrine in connection with certain provisions of the Constitu-
tion, most notably the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. These provisions have been held to 
apply only to the infliction of injuries that can somehow be attrib-
uted to a "state." The infliction of similar injuries by private per-
sons, under this doctrine, are left unregulated by constitutional rule. 
A second, although less apparent, application of this distinc-
tion is connected with the rule that only injuries resulting from in-
tentional actions of the state create a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.4 When the state's action was not intended to inflict 
the injury complained of, the courts refuse to acknowledge that the 
state conduct is its legal cause. Rather, the complainant's situation 
is attributed to other, private factors. The state, which by hypothe-
sis has acted neutrally and innocently, cannot be held responsible 
for the acts of those private agents.s 
Finally, the public-private distinction is implicit in the com-
mon refusal of courts to interpret the rules of the Constitution as 
imposing affirmative duties on the state.6 The enforcement of such 
duties would often effectively hold the state accountable for the pri-
3. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. lnis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972). 
4. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (equal protection); Daniels v. Williams, 
474 U.S. 327 (1986) (due process). 
5. See David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 935,967-68 (1989); Louis Michael Seidman, Public Principle and Private Choice: The 
Uneasy Case for a Boundary Maintenance Theory of Constitutional Law, 96 Yale L.J. 1006, 
1041 (1987). A similar analysis is possible for cases holding that courts should not require 
elimination of racial imbalance in schools where all segregation attributable to de jure action 
has been eliminated. See Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S.Ct. 1430 (1992). 
6. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 197-99, 204-
05 (1989). 
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vately inflicted injuries its positive actions might have prevented. 
The refusal to find such affirmative duties, therefore, amounts to a 
judgment that the Constitution is usually not concerned with pri-
vate courses of conduct. 1 
Concrete issues of constitutional application often can be ex-
pressed in any of the three ways mentioned. We can use as an ex-
ample the questions involved in the Supreme Court's much 
criticized decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of 
Social Services.s In that case the representatives of a four-year-old 
child sought redress, as a matter of constitutionallaw,9 for severe 
injuries the child sustained as a result of beatings from his father. 
The defendant social service agency had, despite strong indications 
of the risks to the child, failed to remove him from the danger. The 
holding that the injuries in this case did not result from a violation 
of the rules of the Constitution may be put three different ways. 
First, it might be that the injuries were the actions of the father, a 
private person acting as such, not any actions of the state. There-
fore they did not implicate the proscriptions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Second, it could be held that even if the conduct of 
the state agency led to the injuries, that conduct was not intention-
ally aimed at causing the harm and, therefore, could not violate the 
amendment. Finally, the complaint in this case called for an inter-
pretation of the Fourteenth Amendment that imposes affirmative 
duties on the state to alter the essentially private circumstances that 
led to the injuries. Such duties, it would be argued, are not within 
the command of the amendment. It should be clear that all these 
formulations state essentially the same thing. There is a certain cat-
7. The necessary relationship between the presence or absence of affirmative constitu-
tional state duties and the applicability or non-applicability of constitutional limitations to 
private individuals is discussed in Peter E. Quint, Free Speech and Private Law in German 
Constitutional Theory, 48 Md. L. Rev. 247, 346-47 (1989). In connection with a recent judg-
ment of the European Court of Justice, the Advocate General suggested a similar relationship 
between the duties of states to implement European Community directives on employment 
discrimination and the legal obligations of private employers. He discussed the argument 
that a failure to implement by the state ought not to be relied on to justify discrimination in 
conflict with the objectives of the European law. Acknowledging the advantages of such a 
position, including the elimination of the "awkward problems of delimitation ... in connec-
tion with the term "state," between the public sector and the private sector," he declined to 
accept the argument. See Barber v. Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group [1990) 2 
C.M.L.R. 513 (para. 50). 
8. 489 U.S. 189 (1989). See, e.g., Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 
88 Mich. L. Rev. 2271 (1990); Aviam Soifer, Moral Ambition, Formalism, and the "Free 
World" o/DeShaney, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1513 (1989). 
9. DeShaney was a damages action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To make out such a cause 
of action the plaintiff was obliged to show that the child suffered a deprivation of a constitu-
tional right. In this context that meant he had to show that his injury resulted from a viola-
tion of that provision of the Fourteenth Amendment providing that no "state" shall "deprive 
any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law." 
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egory of harms in the world with which the Constitution (or the 
relevant part of the Constitution) has nothing to do. That is the 
category of private conduct. 
Most of the academic commentary on this question has been 
unsympathetic to the public-private distinction. Sometimes this 
criticism has denied the possibility of conclusively labeling an action 
as public or private and sometimes, assuming the capacity to distin-
guish public from private, it has denied that there is sound basis in 
constitutional policy for maintaining the dichotomy. If such criti-
cism were incorporated into governing constitutional law, the con-
sequences would be clear. The Constitution would be applied to 
ostensibly private as well as obviously public acts. Unintended as 
well as intentional injuries caused by the state would be deemed to 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The proscriptions of the Con-
stitution would be interpreted to impose affirmative duties on the 
state to correct or to provide a remedy for certain constitutionally 
objectionable states of affairs. 
It is important to note that the relevance of the public-private 
distinction need not be identical for every one of the rules of the 
Constitution. There are some provisions of the Constitution whose 
texts evince an intention directly to reach private conduct. The 
now-repealed Eighteenth Amendment is probably the clearest case 
and the Thirteenth Amendment has been interpreted in the same 
way.w The prevailing test for violations of the First Amendment's 
ban on the establishment of religion implies that an unintended pro-
motion of religion may, nonetheless, be a violation of the Constitu-
tion. II The constitutional text, moreover, has many obvious 
"affirmative" duties, from the requirement that each house of Con-
gress keep a journal to the President's obligation to "take care" that 
the laws be faithfully executed. 
The public-private problem would, we might expect, be most 
acute in those provisions of the Constitution that are unclear as to 
their intended subjects. These include, for example, many of the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights.12 Remarkably, however, the focus 
10. U.S. Const. amend. XVIII, § I: 
After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or trans-
portation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the expor-
tation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited. 
With respect to the Thirteenth Amendment see e.g. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 
20 (1883); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437-44 (1968). 
II. Under the rule of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) a statute is uncon-
stitutional if "its principal or primary effect" either advances or inhibits religion. 
12. Many provisions of the Bill of Rights do not specify against whom they are di-
rected. See, e.g., U.S. Const. amends. Ill, IV, VIII. The United States Supreme Court long 
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of discussion in the literature, as well as the occasion for most of the 
relevant litigation, has been on section one of the Fourteenth 
Amendment which, by its apparently plain words, appears solely 
directed to certain affirmative injuries worked by a "state." The 
claim that even such language can be applied without regard to a 
difference between public and private conduct is sometimes based 
on a perceived ambiguity in the words of the text. The state is pro-
hibited from "denying" or "depriving," terms which might be un-
derstood as being concerned with failures to provide a remedy for 
some existing situation. 13 Other arguments to the same effect rely 
on a historical reading of the intentions of the enactors of the 
amendment concluding that, notwithstanding their choice of words, 
they wished to constitutionalize an affirmative duty of states to pro-
vide minimum protection for certain activities.I4 
In much of the academic criticism, though, the argument is 
more basic. It is premised on a more or less wholesale rejection of 
the coherence or sense of the public-private distinction. If this ar-
gument is persuasive, the text or history of the amendment is irrele-
vant. Indeed, a provision like section one of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, with its apparently express limitation to conduct of 
the state, makes an especially appealing test case for applying these 
conceptual claims. It is this general criticism with which I will be 
concerned here-the argument that the limitation of a constitu-
tional rule (I, too, will concentrate on the Fourteenth Amendment) 
to public activity is irrational or, indeed, impossible. Is My conclu-
sion is that while the deconstruction of the public-private distinc-
tion is in some forms convincing, some ex ante limitation of the field 
of constitutional application is necessary if the Constitution is to 
ago resolved this ambiguity with respect to questions of federalism by confining them to 
actions of the federal government. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). The 
absence of a specific reference in certain state constitutional rights texts has led to a similar 
consideration of state action questions in the state courts. Compare Cologne v. Westfarms 
Associates, 192 Conn. 48, 469 A.2d 1201 (1984) with Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 
Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
13. See Kevin Cole, Federal and State "State Action": The Undercritical Embrace of a 
Hypercriticized Doctrine, 24 Ga. L. Rev. 327, 350 (1990); Thomas A. Eaton and Michael 
Wells, Governmental Inaction as a Constitutional Tort: DeShaney and Its Aftermath, 66 
Wash. L. Rev. 107, 116-17 (1991). But see David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitu-
tional Rights, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 864, 864-65 (I 986) ("[D]epriving suggests aggressive state 
activity, not mere failure to help.") 
14. Aviam Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger's History, 54 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 651 (1979); Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection. 
Liberty and the Founeenth Amendment, 41 Duke L.J. 507 (1991). 
15. See, e,g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 503, 505 
(1985) (noting arguments that the state action doctrine "never could be rationally or consist-
ently applied.") 
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play the special role which is usually perceived for it in the legal 
system. 
In Part II I will recapitulate the scholarly attack on the public-
private distinction and conclude that, on its terms, this attack is 
successful: there are no essentially private actions. In Part III, I 
will attempt to extract the impulses that lie behind the persistence 
of the distinction in the teeth of these difficulties. That is, I will 
attempt to summarize the utility of the distinction as commonly 
understood for a legal system that assumes a fundamental difference 
between constitutional and ordinary law. In Part IV, I will suggest 
how the public-private distinction might be made more workable by 
marking out for constitutional regulation the affirmative use of the 
state's lawmaking power. In Part V, I will posit some reasons why 
this more tenable version of the public-private distinction might 
make sense in the creation and application of constitutional rules. 
II 
The overwhelming weight of published academic opinion has 
rejected the premise that legal doctrine can rest on a supposed dis-
tinction between public and private actions.l6 Even in conduct in 
which no state official participates, it is possible to discern some 
decision of the state. All conduct takes place in a regime of state 
prohibitions and either explicit or implicit state permissions. All 
legally permitted actions may be said to occur (so far as their legal 
character is concerned) because of a state decision not to prohibit 
them. As such, the state must be said to carry at least some respon-
sibility for the injuries such actions cause.11 
Public decisions, moreover, define the preconditions against 
which all ostensible private conduct takes place. Explicit govern-
ment actions on such things as fiscal and monetary policy, licensing 
of occupations, zoning, and education, among many other subjects, 
determine the environment in which individual decisions are made, 
16. See Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional Choices 247-48, 422 n. 8 (Harv. U. Press, 
1985) (citing authorities). 
17. See Larry Alexander and Paul Horton, Whom Does the Constitution Command? 22, 
74-75 (Greenwood Press, 1988); Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on 
Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1296, 1301 (1982); Chemerinsky, 80 Nw. U. L. 
Rev. at 527 (cited in note 15). 
The descriptions of behavior emphasized in this section, it must be stressed, are offered 
for the purpose of characterizing them with regard to the question of constitutional coverage. 
That is, I am interested in the legal system's viewpoint. It should go without saying that there 
are many other equally valid non-legal characterizations that may be apt when different ques-
tions are at issue. Similarly, the use of lawmaking authority may itself track some perceived 
independent patterns of conduct. From the narrow perspective of the application of law, 
however, it is the legal definition which is dispositive. 
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and determine, in significant degree, the costs and benefits of alter-
native personal choices.ls 
Perhaps more fundamentally, the very definition oflegal injury 
requires some pre-existing definitions of interests, the interference 
with which gives rise to a grievance. But those definitions are, 
themselves (insofar as relevant in legal decision-making), legally 
constructed. Exclusions from those definitions account for the un-
redressability of certain wrongs. That the physical invasion of my 
house by a private person may be termed a legal wrong, while the 
erection by the same person of an ugly structure down the street is 
not, is the result of an implicit state decision. My suffering from the 
aesthetic affront may thus be attributed to the state. This inextrica-
ble involvement of the state in defining property interests accounts 
for the many bewildering problems of the constitutional law of tak-
ings. There is no clear distinction between a state invasion of prop-
erty interests and its inevitable role in defining those interests.t9 
That defining role of the state may also be recognized even when the 
invasion is effected by private persons. 
In the same way, relations within a family, which might have 
been thought classically private matters, have been exposed as nec-
essarily involving the adjustment of law-created statuses by parties 
wielding law-created authority.2o While there are, no doubt, in-
dependent religious or cultural vantage points from which to con-
sider family relations,21 it is impossible to deal with the rights and 
wrongs of family behavior without considering the dense complex 
of marriage law, custody law, property law, education law and 
other legal relations against which every private action takes 
place.22 
18. See, e.g., Robert L. Hale, Freedom Through Law 3-13 (Columbia U. Press, 1952); 
Bandes, 88 Mich. L. Rev. at 2306 (cited in note 8). On the pervasive influence of legal deci· 
sions, see Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can 
Learn From Modern Physics, 103 Harv. L. Rev. I (1989). 
19. For a thorough treatment of this problem see Jeremy Paul, The Hidden Structure of 
Takings Law, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1393 (1991). 
20. Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. Mich. J.L. 
Ref. 835 ( 1985). 
21. See Carol Weisbrod, Family Governance: A Reading of Kafka's Letter to His Father, 
24 Toledo L. Rev.- (forthcoming 1993). 
22. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), Glona v. American Guarantee Co., 391 
U.S. 73, 76-79 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting in both cases). The controlling nature of legal 
definition has not always been accepted in constitutional adjudication. See, e.g., Moore v. City 
of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 500-03 (1977). Similarly, the European Court of Human 
Rights, in its interpretation of the "right to respect" for "family life" in Article 8 of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, has 
recognized a basic "natural" dimension to the definition of the family. See Mark W. Janis 
and Richard S. Kay, European Human Rights Law 179-85 (U. of Conn. Law Sch. Press, 
1990). 
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We may take the pervasive influence of law one step further. 
The very definition of a person is, in many respects, a legal artifice. 
The corporate personality is the most familiar example of this phe-
nomenon. But the influence of legal definition is far broader than 
this. That a human being can sustain a legal wrong but a tree can-
not is the result of an implicit decision of the state. It is, however, 
by no means an inevitable decision.23 That a ship can commit a 
legal wrong while a hurricane cannot is the product of a similarly 
contingent public judgment.24 The history of slavery reveals that 
not even a physical human being is immune from redefinition with 
respect to the capacity to bear rights and duties.2s Phillip Blumberg 
has summarized the breadth and variety of the legal system's exer-
cise of this power to designate persons (or legal units) that can suf-
fer and inflict harm: 
Distinguished by their particular legal rights and responsibilities, 
each class of legal unit is unique. They include legal subjects as 
disparate as individuals, maritime vessels, physical objects, part-
nerships, associations, special accounts, funds, economic interest 
groupings, and governmental agencies, as well as the corporation 
and the corporate group. In each case, the attribution of rights 
and responsibilities demarcating the perimeters of legal recogni-
tion of the unit reflects all the factors that underlie societal law-
making: the historical development of the law, changing values 
and interests, socio-economic and political forces, and concep-
tual currents.26 
Thus the very conceptual categories in which we define what is 
an injury, who has caused it, and who has suffered from it are pub-
lic artifacts. Perhaps more to the point, the distinction between 
public and private is itself determined by law. These attributes, in 
the sense in which they are relevant to the questions under study, 
do not exist in the natural world. They are part of the positive busi-
ness of inclusion and exclusion that occurs in the creation and oper-
ation of govemment.27 There are, of course, things that concern 
23. See Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward Legal Rights for 
Natural Objects, 45 S. Cal. L. Rev. 450 (1972). 
24. United States v. The Little Charles, 1 Brock. 347, 354, 26 F. Cas. 979, 982 (C. C. Va. 
1818) (No. 15,612) (Marshall, Circuit Justice). 
25. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The American Law of Slavery, 1810-1860: A Study in the 
Persistence of Legal Autonomy, 10 Law & Soc. Rev. 119 (1975). 
26. Phillip I. Blumberg, The Multinational Challenge to Corporation Law: The Search 
for a New Corporate Personality 207 (Oxford U. Press, 1993). Much of my discussion on this 
point was suggested by Blumberg's treatment of the recognition of legal units in Chapter 9 of 
this work at 205-15. 
27. Only the acceptance of some pre-legal or natural law categories could account for 
the ideas of private and public independent of positive actions of the state. See Brest, 130 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. at 1300 (cited in note 17). For the judges of the substantive due process era such 
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one or a few people and things that concern many people. But that 
is not the difference with which we are concerned. A bill of attain-
der is undoubtedly a public act though directed at only one person, 
while we usually consider the policy decisions of a large corporation 
affecting thousands to be private. But since those corporate policies 
might, by legislative decision, come to be determined by public reg-
ulation, the characterization as private is itself a public matter. 
Maintenance of the public-private distinction thus creates an ines-
capable problem of self-reference: the Constitution is concerned 
only with public things and not with private things. The determina-
tion of the content of the categories of public and private things is a 
public thing.2s 
III 
Although the constitutional distinction between the public and 
the private as essential qualities of conduct cannot be maintained 
(for the reasons that have been discussed), it nonetheless appeals to 
a powerful intuition about constitutional law. That intuition is the 
idea that the rules of the Constitution make up a separate and ex-
ceptional body of law with its own subject matter and its own limits. 
This body of law is distinct from ordinary law in the same way that 
federal law is distinct from Connecticut law or the by-laws of a uni-
versity are distinct from municipal law. Each such body of law de-
rives from a different lawmaking authority and each has a distinct 
field of application. Inevitably these legal regimes overlap but when 
that overlap creates a conflict we usually have hierarchical rules for 
resolving it.29 The existence of overlaps and means of coordination 
do not negate the fact of separate bodies of rules for separate func-
tions. Indeed, the resolution of conflicts would not be possible if we 
could not classify laws as belonging to a higher or lower category 
within the hierarchy of law. 
The Constitution is one such legal regime. It is, almost defini-
a natural division was assumed. See Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurispru-
dence of Government-Business Relations: Some Parameters of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 
1863-1897, 61 J. Am. Hist. 970 (1975). The disappearance of such a conception from modern 
jurisprudence is one of the reasons the maintenance of the public-private distinction has 
caused such problems. See Brest, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1301 (cited in note 17); Seidman, 96 
Yale L.J. at 1017 (cited in note 5). 
28. For a general discussion of the pervasiveness of problems of self-reference in law see 
John M. Rogers and Roben E. Molzon, Some Lessons About the Law From Self-Referential 
Problems in Mathematics, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 992 (1992) 
29. I am concerned now with different bodies of public law within a single legal system. 
There are also other religious, ethnic or familial bodies of law that collide with or accommo-
date the state's law in less predictable ways. See Carol Weisbrod, Practical Polyphony: Theo-
ries of the State and Feminist Jurisprudence, 24 Ga. L. Rev. 985 (1990). 
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tionally, the paramount body of law in a given legal system.Jo And, 
traditionally, we have thought that it too has a limited field of appli-
cation. Most commonly we think of the Constitution as the law 
that defines and limits the reach of the state. Every constitution is 
superimposed on a field of pre-existing law, the continuing existence 
of which it presupposes.3t This was true of the United States Con-
stitution of 1787 and certainly of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
Constitution consists of "a collection of rules about the rules and 
uses of law. "32 
Because of the extraordinary nature of the law of the Constitu-
tion, it has certain characteristics that mark it off from other kinds 
of law. Since it is directed not at particular questions of policy, but 
at the scope and shape of the lawmaking power in general, it is 
premised on large principles of government. Consequently, its 
promulgation requires an unusually broad political consensus. The 
ratification of the 1787 Constitution by "the People" or their surro-
gates and the broad approval required for amendments under Arti-
cle V evidence this concern.33 For similar reasons, the rules of the 
Constitution need to be relatively long-term. The very same im-
pulse that argues for legal constraints on the power of the state sug-
gests that frequent modification influenced by short term political 
considerations should be avoided. Therefore, constitutional rules 
tend to be rigid, requiring a difficult and cumbersome process for 
change.34 Lastly, the idea that a constitution consists of more or 
less permanent principles to be imposed on the ordinary lawmaking 
process calls for application and enforcement by disinterested 
agents committed not to their own ideas of policy, but to the norms 
embodied in the constitutional rules. It is this need that has fre-
quently been cited as justifying the practice of constitutional review 
by the independent judiciary.Js 
These characteristics of constitutional law are in many ways 
unsuitable for ordinary law. Although that law takes many forms, 
it tends to be more concerned with the resolution of day to day 
30. An interesting variation is the Dutch Constitution which provides that treaties ap-
proved by two-thirds of the legislature prevail over the constitution itself. See Constitution of 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands, (1983) arts. 91(3), 94 in II Constitutions of the Countries of 
the World 23-24 (Albert P. Blaustein and Gilbert H. Flanz, eds., Oceana Pub., 1990). 
31. See J.M. Finnis, Revolutions and Continuity of Law, in A.W.B. Simpson, ed., Ox-
ford Essays in Jurisprudence (Second Series) 44 (Clarendon Press, 1973). 
32. Tribe, Constitutional Choices at 246 (cited in note 16). 
33. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 266-94 (Belknap Press, 
1991). 
34. See F.A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty 126-80, 208-09 (U. of Chi. Press, 1960). 
35. See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 25-28 (Bobbs-Merrill, 
1962). 
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problems of social living. It must deal with far more particular and 
far more varied problems. Instead of large principles it must act on 
more narrow policies. Instead of rigid rules it calls for flexible re-
sponses. Rather than pronouncement by judges committed to pre-
existing standards already accepted as legitimate, its legitimacy de-
pends on its formulation by democratically accountable officials.J6 
To apply the rules of the Constitution to all activity that can be 
logically denominated public under the reasoning in the last section 
would seriously threaten this distinction between constitutional and 
ordinary law. Modern interpretations of the rules of the Constitu-
tion do not specify narrowly defined duties and prohibitions. They 
declare general standards of conduct. Most notably, the Equal Pro-
tection and Due Process Clauses, as interpreted by the Supreme 
Court, may plausibly be taken to present for judicial resolution the 
validity of any state action causing significant injury that is claimed 
to be arbitrary or unjustified.J7 The central paradigm for modern 
constitutional law is the process of balancing the individual injury 
complained of against the social benefits from the state's action.38 
Consequently, a wider reach of the constitutional rules would inevi-
tably create more occasions for measuring the relative strengths of 
constitutional claims in the pa11icular circumstances. Given the 
36. See William P. Marshall, Diluting Constitutional Rights: Rethinking "Rethinking 
State Action", 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 558, 566-67 (1985). See also Archie v. City of Racine, 847 
F.2d 1211, 1224 (7th Cir. 1988) (A municipal government is confronted with the kind of 
choice that is "without a single right answer, and therefore one for the political rather than 
the judicial branches.") 
37. Any injury can be phrased as either a case of having something taken away from 
you (life, liberty or property), or of being treated less well than someone else, and usually as 
both. This is not to say that such actions will always be invalid. The Supreme Court's vari-
ous standards of review for various kinds of actions will determine the likelihood that any 
particular action will be found unconstitutional. As discussed below, however, all of these 
tests translate to one form or another of interest balancing. See Richard S. Kay, Constitu-
tional Cultures: Constitutional Law, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 311, 319-20 (1990). 
38. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 Yale 
L.J. 943 (1987). Even were this form of judicial review not already entrenched in our consti-
tutional practice, the effective extension of constitutional adjudication to individual actions in 
any way attributable to the state would demand it. That is because such cases would raise 
constitutional values on both sides of the litigation. Attempts to inhibit by constitutional rule 
individual actions would much more obviously imperil the defendants' interests in property 
and privacy-interests with a recognized constitutional dimension. Where the grievance 
raised is the direct affirmative action of the state, such interests on the part of the state-
defendant tend to be absent. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Louis M. Seidman et al., Constitutional 
Law 1598-1600 (Little, Brown & Co., 2d ed. 1991). In Germany, where constitutional rights 
have been held relevant to decisions in litigation between private parties, see note 45, this 
phenomenon is now well-established. One thoughtful commentator has observed that this 
has not resulted in a clear strengthening of constitutional values. See Quint, 48 Md. L. Rev. 
at 286-89,298-302,313-14,343-44 (cited in note 7). Worries about possible dilution of rights 
as a result of such balancing underlie some commentators' concerns about relaxing the Amer-
ican state action doctrine. See Marshall, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 558 (cited in note 36). 
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breadth of such claims, such a development would produce an even 
more widespread employment of ad hoc balancing. 
Since it is an axiom of the legal system that the law of the 
Constitution is superior to the ordinary law, the result of such an 
extension would be that the great mass of human activity would be 
directly subject to the Constitution notwithstanding any other regu-
lation by law. That is, such activity would have to satisfy the ordi-
nary law and in addition it would have to pass judicial muster under 
constitutional review. While the requirements of the ordinary law 
would remain in place (assuming they were themselves constitu-
tional), that aspect of it which represents the lawmaker's choice as 
to what conduct to control, how to control it, and what to leave 
uncontrolled, would often be displaced in important respects. 
What is involved in such an application of the Constitution, 
then, would be a very substantial transfer of power from the ordi-
nary law-making agencies to the constitutional decision-making 
procedure of the courts.39 Conduct which the legislatures and com-
mon law courts had deemed proper to be left to individual decision-
making would now be reviewable for constitutionality under the 
typical balancing tests of modern constitutional jurisprudence. In-
deed, such constitutional balancing in the case of ostensibly private 
as well as public conduct has been cited as being favored by "almost 
unanimous" academic opinion. 40 One such commentator summa-
rizes the effect of this approach: 
If the state action requirement were abolished, the courts in each 
instance would determine whether the [individual] infringer's 
freedom adequately justified permitting the alleged violation. 
Eliminating the concept of state action merely means that the 
courts would have to reach the merits and decide if a sufficient 
justification exists; courts could not dismiss cases based solely on 
the lack of government involvement.41 
It is apparent how different this picture of constitutional law is 
from the limited and exceptional legal regime I have described 
above. That regime was restricted to extraordinary occasions and 
involved the application of one of a few fundamental and permanent 
norms that had been legitimated by a unique political consensus. 
The combined effect of the broader reading of the substantive con-
39. See Cole, 24 Ga. L. Rev. at 379-81 (cited in note 13); Jesse H. Choper, Thoughts on 
State Action: The "Government Function" and "Power Theory" Approaches, 1979 Wash. U. 
L.Q. 757; Quint, 48 Md. L. Rev. at 344-45 (cited in note 7); Henry C. Strickland, The State 
Action Doctrine and the Rehnquist Court, 18 Hastings Const. L.Q. 588, 612-13, 661 (1991). 
40. Mark Tushnet, Shelley v. Kraemer and Theories of Equality, 33 N.Y.L. Sch. L. 
Rev. 383, 391 (1988). 
41. Chemerinsky, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 506 (cited in note 15); see id. at 540. 
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stitutional rules and the abandonment of any notion of identifiably 
public and private conduct is to subject all human conduct to ad 
hoc judicial supervision superior to any differing legislative 
judgment. 
There could scarcely be a description of constitutional law 
more distant from the traditional understanding. The central pur-
pose of constitutions was the creation of a set of preexisting limits to 
the interferences with individual action historically associated with 
the state.4z Beyond that zone of immunity created by constitutions, 
individuals live in a world of risk stemming from both governmen-
tal and non-governmental sources. The value of this regime is en-
tirely dependent on the ability to identify, with relative certainty, 
the situations in which the entrenched constitutional limits do and 
do not apply. The substitution of a balancing process for the appli-
cation of fixed rules has substantially undermined that capacity.43 
The extension of that mode of adjudication as the final test for the 
legality of all action undercuts the certainty made possible by legis-
lative regulation (which is almost always prospective) and even by 
fairly well entrenched common law rules.« Instead of a known 
field of action governed by known rules, the logical implications of 
the elimination of the public-private distinction, in the context of 
modern approaches to constitutional interpretation, threatens to 
convert constitutional adjudication into what Zephaniah Swift 
called "one great arbitration that would engulf the courts of law, 
and sovereign discretion would be the only rule of decision-a state 
of things equally favorable to lawyers and criminals."45 
42. See F.A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty at 178-82 (cited in note 34); Daniels v. 
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986) ("Our Constitution deals with the large concerns of the 
governors and the governed, but it does not purport to supplant traditional tort law in laying 
down rules of conduct to regulate liability for injuries that attend living together in society.") 
43. See Aleinikolf, 96 Yale L.J. 943 (cited in note 38). 
44. Generally the stability of common law rules is protected by the doctrine of stare 
decisis. While stare decisis will apply as well to constitutional balancing, the very structure of 
that process allows less predictable results while maintaining the same rule. 
The object of distinguishing an independent field for constitutional law could theoreti-
cally be accomplished by devices other than some form of the public-private distinction. For 
example, a stricter definition of the substantive content of the rules of the Constitution could 
provide a distinction based not on the agents subject to the rule but on the conduct (by 
whomever undertaken) addressed by the rules. If one were starting from scratch this might 
be an equally or even more promising way to define the limits of constitutional law. 
(Although, for reasons noted in note 38, the inevitable clash of constitutional interests on 
both sides of litigation between private parties would make judicial balancing of some kind a 
structural necessity. With constitutional claims assertable only against the state such balanc-
ing is, at least theoretically, avoidable.) But, of course, we are not starting from scratch. The 
historical centrality of the distinction between state and private power, and the fluidity and 
breadth of the substantive constitutional rules as interpreted, may provide some justification 
for proceeding by way of an attempted reconstruction of the public-private distinction. 
45. Quoted in Patrick B. O'Sullivan, Biographies of Connecticut Judges: Zephaniah 
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IV 
If a distinction between constitutional and ordinary law is to be 
preserved, some way must be devised to limit its field of application. 
If the public-private distinction is to be employed for that purpose, 
it will, in light of the criticisms summarized, be necessary to con-
struct a category of state conduct that can be distinguished from 
non-state conduct. Beyond that it will be necessary to explain why 
that category is peculiarly suitable for constitutional regulation. 
This cannot be, of course, a merely logical exercise. Logic, we 
have seen, carried to its conclusion, demands that the Constitution 
apply to everything if it is to apply to anything. It should, instead, 
involve an attempt to understand the field of action that the Consti-
tution itself claims to regulate. This is nothing but an interpretation 
of the constitutional rules. It simply is not credible that the enac-
tors of the Constitution believed that they were setting up rules to 
govern all human conduct. They were not interested in creating 
ideal conceptual categories but in a practical specification of regu-
lated and prohibited activities. Few would argue with the general 
proposition that, at least in promulgating those rules of the Consti-
tution whose text or history do not evince a broader intent, they 
were not concerned with every action prescribed or permitted by 
the state, but with the injuries that flowed from the positive employ-
ment of the unique power of the state.46 
It is consistent with this concern to suppose that, where its 
rules refer explicitly or implicitly to the state, the Constitution lim-
its what may be called acts of lawmaking. I use the term "lawmak-
ing" in a somewhat broader sense than it is usually employed. I 
Sw1jt, 19 Conn. Bar J. 181, 188-89 (1945). Swift was referring to a regime of legislative 
supremacy but the comparison remains apt. 
Although the German legal system has not become one of "sovereign discretion," it has 
developed a margin of considerable uncertainty as a result of the application of constitutional 
norms to private law adjudication. The Constitutional Court has held that the rules of the 
Basic Law, while not directly applicable to private persons, nevertheless affect the interpreta-
tion and application of private law rules. The Basic Law has established an "objective order-
ing of values" which must permeate every aspect of the legal system. The civil law, as one 
commentator has put it, "should keep in sight the image of human nature set forth in the 
fundamental rights" in the Basic Law. Christian Starck, Constitutional Definition and Protec-
tion of Rights and Freedoms in C. Starck, ed., Rights. Institutions and Impact of International 
Law according to the German Basic Law 19, 51 (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1987). This, of 
course, may necessitate the balancing of competing constitutional interests of the parties, 
requiring the judge to "analyze, in each case, the extent (intensity) of the overstepping of a 
legally sustainable position and then proceed to achieve a balance, optimally maintaining 
both of the opposing positions." ld. at 52 (citations omitted). This process has substantially 
diminished the clarity of constitutional rules. For a valuable discussion see Quint, 48 Md. L. 
Rev. 24 7 (cited in note 7). 
46. See, e.g., Cologne v. Westfarms Associates, 192 Conn. 48, 60-62, 469 A.2d 1201, 
1208-1209 (1984). 
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mean acts stemming from decisions of human beings acting solely 
in the exercise of powers created by the Constitution or recognized 
by the Constitution as already possessing authority to prescribe 
rules of conduct binding on individuals. Put more concretely, in 
respect to the United States Constitution, this means acts of Con-
gress and acts of the President in the attempted exercise of his con-
stitutionally granted authority. It also means acts of the States, 
acting through the analogous public agents, under controlling state 
law. This definition makes no attempt to distinguish the exercise of 
power that is "truly public" from that which is essentially private. 
For reasons already described, no such distinction is tenable. The 
exercise of power by individuals is admittedly public insofar as it 
takes place within a world of assumptions and categories with legal 
attributes. Rather, this approach isolates those particular exercises 
of public power which were the historical focus of the act of consti-
tution-making. Persons, property, contracts and other legal arti-
fices comprised a pre-existing background against which the 
Constitution was written.47 They were not its target. This limita-
tion supposes that (for reasons that will be considered more fully in 
the next section) the creators of the Constitution were troubled by 
certain specific loci of power, from which, experience led them to 
believe, there were special dangers and insufficient safeguards. 
Before elaborating the reasons that might move constitution-
makers so to restrict their efforts, it might be useful to define with 
somewhat more detail what such a model would and would not 
cover.4s It would most obviously include statutes and explicit exer-
cises of constitutionally vested executive powers. It would also ex-
tend to the rules promulgated by federal and state courts in the 
exercise of their common law powers. 49 (For reasons to be noted, 
however, this does not include the simple employment of otherwise 
valid rules of law by individuals.) It is fair to regard the creation of 
such rules as the exercise of the lawmaking power of the state. 
Since such rules are subject to revision and reversal by the legisla-
47. Thomas P. Lewis, Book Review, 8 Const. Comm. 486, 492, 501 (1991) (reviewing 
Larry Alexander and Paul Horton, Whom Does the Constitution Command? (Greenwood 
Press, 1988)). 
48. I should point out that, while I believe this explanation is consistent with what I 
know about the purposes of the enactors of the Constitution, I have made no attempt to 
canvass the historical record. I do not present this as an actual representation of the constitu-
tion-makers' intentions. Since, as I have noted, individual provisions may have somewhat 
different intended scopes, I regard it merely a sensible presumption as to the reach of the 
rules of the Constitution, subject to rebuttal in particular cases. Moreover, while I think this 
approach is largely consistent with the adjudicated law of the state action doctrine, it also 
departs from it some significant ways. See, e.g. text at notes 54-58 infra. 
49. See, e.g., American Fed. of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321,325-26 (1941). 
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ture, they may, in fact, be regarded as a species of delegated 
legislation. 
The amenability of lawmaking (as defined) to control by the 
rules of the Constitution carries it with the further conclusion that 
the actions of public officials acting pursuant to constitutionally 
contestable legislation is also subject to constitutional constraint. 
When the authorizing legislation is invalid the execution of its com-
mands is naturally invalid. Even when the legislation merely cre-
ates a discretion that can be used in a way that violates the 
constitutional rules, it is reasonable to regard the authorizing legis-
lation as invalid to the extent it provides the sole basis for the pro-
hibited result.so What we are concerned with, in every case, are the 
vires of the institutions created by or recognized by the Constitution 
itself. That concern is implicated only by actions "having the cast 
of law."st 
The logic of this definition of the reach of the Constitution 
would exclude two kinds of actions often argued to be state action. 
First it would not extend the rules of the Constitution to actions by 
public officials in violation of ordinary law. Such actions would not 
be a consequence of any wrongful act by the lawmaking power, 
which is the sole concern of the Constitution. That lawmaking au-
thority has been exercised in perfect conformity to constitutional 
rules and any relief for wrongs suffered may be addressed to the 
ordinary rules created by it.s2 Those rules may or may not protect 
against some particular action or provide a remedy for injuries re-
sulting from it. But if they do not, the wrong suffered, which by 
hypothesis arises in a regime of constitutionally perfect law, cannot 
implicate the special dangers to which the Constitution is 
addressed. 
This conclusion, of course, is at odds with reasonably well es-
tablished constitutional doctrine. For a brief period the Supreme 
Court flirted with the proposition that acts admittedly in violation 
of state law could not contravene the Fourteenth Amendment, not 
being acts "of the state." This doctrine seemed to have been an-
nounced by the Court in 1904 in Barney v. City of New Yorks 3 but, 
after a brief period of indecision, was plainly, if not expressly, re-
50. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 366 (1886). 
51. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 236 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citation 
omitted). 
52. Even if an action by a state official is in technical violation of a state rule of law, if 
no sanction is provided for it, it may be reasonable to treat it as authorized and thus within 
the prohibition of the Constitution. Thus the Civil Rights statutes refer to deprivation of 
rights "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... " 
42 u.s.c. § 1983. 
53. 193 u.s. 430 (1904). 
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jected in the 1913 decision in Home Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. 
City of Los Angeles.s4 The same view was maintained in more re-
cent cases construing the reach of the post-Civil War civil rights 
statutes' specification of acts undertaken "under color of law" over 
dissents reiterating the reasoning of the repudiated doctrine of Bar-
ney v. City of New York.ss Those dissents emphasized the danger of 
superimposing a more or less general federal tort and criminal juris-
diction on the law of the states.s6 Such a result, the dissenters 
claimed, could be avoided by restricting the extraordinary reach of 
federal law, including the Constitution, to instances where the 
wrong had occurred as a result of the "authentic command of the 
State."s7 
54. 227 U.S. 278 (1913). The illegality of the challenged action under state law did not 
prevent a finding of unconstitutionality in Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co., 207 U.S. 
20 (1907) despite the dissent of Justice Holmes citing Barney. Such actions were held not 
subject to constitutional scrutiny again in City of Memphis v. Cumberland Telephone and 
Telegraph Co., 218 U.S. 624 (1910). Barney was disparaged but not overruled in Home Tele-
phone and has not been relied on since. In United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 26 (1960) 
Justice Brennan referred to Barney as "having been worn away by the erosion of time and of 
contrary authority." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
Some commentators have suggested that recent holdings of the Supreme Court involving 
claimed violations of procedural due process have, at least in this area, effectively revived the 
doctrine of Barney v. New York. See Henry Paul Monaghan, State Law Wrongs, State Law 
Remedies, and the Founeenth Amendment, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 979 (1986); Edward B. Foley, 
Unauthorized Conduct of State Officials Under the Founeenth Amendment: Hudson v. Palmer 
and the Resurrection of Dead Doctrines, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 837 (1985). 
55. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) and id. at 138 (Roberts, J., dissent-
ing); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) and id. at 202 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
56. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. at 148-49 (Roberts, J., dissenting); Monroe v. 
Pape, 365 U.S. at 239-40 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
57. Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co., 207 U.S. 20, 41 (1907) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting). It need not be the case, however, that such a restriction of the reach of the Constitu-
tion to acts of officials sanctioned by state law creates an "exhaustion" doctrine requiring 
pursuit of relief under ordinary law before a constitutional challenge may be mounted. 
(Although this does appear to be the way Holmes saw it in his dissent to Raymond v. Chicago 
Union Traction Co.) See also Foley, 85 Colum. L. Rev. at 859-60 (cited in note 54). The 
Supreme Court in Home Telephone rightly concluded that such a requirement would lead to 
every claim being first adjudicated under parallel provisions of state constitutions. This is 
simply a matter of the appropriate presumption as to the legality under ordinary law of the 
challenged action. It may well best serve the purpose of the constitutional rules attempting to 
limit the lawmaking power to assume that officials, purporting to be acting under authorized 
law, do so absent a clear showing to the contrary. See Home Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. 
City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 285-89 (1913). 
It should also be pointed out that the restricted coverage suggested in the text is that of 
the substantive provisions of the Constitution. It does not suggest that such unauthorized 
actions by public agents could not be regulated by ordinary law. This might include federal 
statutes authorized under a power-granting provision like section five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). A recent article has suggested 
that the drafters of the reconstruction civil rights statutes chose to prohibit action "under 
color of law" in order to include actions of public officials which were in violation of state 
laws. See Steven L. Winter, The Meaning of "Under Color of" Law, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 323 
(1992). An interpretation of section one of the Fourteenth Amendment and the civil rights 
statutes in which the coverage of the latter was broader than that of the former would be the 
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The second category of actions excluded from this limited class 
of public action subject to the rules of the Constitution would be 
conduct of private persons that is merely permitted by law. This 
category has proved to raise the most perplexing problems in testing 
the reach of the state action doctrine. Illustrative hypothetical cases 
cited in the literature include an individual, acting pursuant to com-
mon law rules of contract or property, discriminating on the basis 
of race in private social relations, firing an employee without notice 
or prohibiting speech on his or her own property. For all the rea-
sons mentioned in the previous section, this conduct cannot be 
called private in any essential way. The state, by regulating there-
gime of legal relations in which such actions can take place, is re-
sponsible, in some way, for the injuries suffered.ss 
The judgment that only the lawmaking power of the state 
should be (presumptively) governed by the Constitution, however, 
excludes such permitted actions from its reach.s9 This limitation is 
consistent with most60 of the pronouncements of the Supreme 
Court on the state action doctrine. In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil 
Co., 61 for example, the court defended its requirement that a Four-
teenth Amendment violation be effected by a "state actor" on the 
ground that otherwise "private parties could face constitutional liti-
gation whenever they seek to rely on some state rule governing their 
interactions with the community surrounding them."62 
The action of the individual permitted by background law is 
not attributable to the state lawmaking power in the same way the 
action of a public official acting pursuant to law usually is. In the 
latter case, the action is generally solely a consequence of an exer-
opposite of that suggested in the dissents in Screws and Monroe, in which it was argued that 
the civil rights statutes, in reaching only genuine acts of the state, were narrower than the 
prohibitions of section one. Even more obviously, relief against the unauthorized acts of 
private officials may be provided by ordinary state statute or tort law. 
58. In such cases the permitted private decision might itself be called "lawmaking." 
See Horton and Alexander, Whom Does the Constitution Command? at 16 (cited in note 17). 
Clearly the lawmaking to which I refer is that decisionmaking by people whose actions are 
immediately authorized by a constitution (state or federal) and that by people whose author-
ity is solely traceable to such decisionmaking. 
59. It follows from this that actual or possible judicial vindication of such action based 
on other rules, not themselves constitutionally contested, should not be considered such an 
exercise of power delegated by the lawmaker as to bring the private action under the rules of 
the Constitution. Thus, neither the much-discussed dinner host who sought judicial relief to 
vindicate his property rights to exclude guests on a racial basis, nor the court granting such 
relief would violate the Equal Protection Clause. 
60. The most celebrated exception is Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. I ( 1948) a case with a 
conspicuously sparse progeny. See also Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
61. 457 u.s. 922 (1981). 
62. 457 U.S. at 937. See also Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978). 
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cise of lawmaking power by the state either directing or permitting 
such action, and it is impossible to adjudicate the constitutionality 
of the act without, at the same time, judging, in some measure, the 
constitutionality of the legislation. Certainly this is true where the 
official merely carries out an order contained in the law. It is also 
true when the law vests discretion in the official whose action then 
occurs only as a result of the exercise of power by a lawmaker. The 
official, in such cases, is very much the "creature" of the lawmaking 
act, and the lawmaking act may be reasonably treated as an active 
cause of the injury. This is usually not true in the same way when 
the action complained of is undertaken by a private person. In most 
cases that action is taken not as a result of a specific and easily 
identifiable lawmaking act, but under the rubric of general and neu-
tral laws. The individual, although acting within a framework of 
law, is deemed, from the viewpoint of the Constitution, to have an 
existence independent of the exercise of lawmaking powers that is 
the special concern of the Constitution. 
This reasoning suggests that, on occasion, a different result 
might obtain. It is possible that a private individual acts only be-
cause they are directed or encouraged63 to do so by an identifiable 
act of legislation that is itself open to constitutional question. In 
such cases the injury created is just as traceable to the lawmaking 
decision as when a public official acts pursuant to authorizing law. 
So in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis64 the action of the lodge was 
state action insofar as it was compelled to follow its own discrimina-
tory charter by virtue of state law.6s Similarly, if, as some commen-
tators understand it, the plaintiff in Shelley v. Kraemer66 was able to 
enforce the restrictive covenant only because of a state property rule 
which, by singling out racially discriminatory restrictive covenants 
as uniquely enforceable, was itself unconstitutional, the judgment 
would be justified on the grounds suggested here. 67 This distinction 
also may account for the difference between the majority opinion in 
Flagg Brothers v. Brooks6s which assumed that the seizure, without 
hearing, of property by a private party might well have occurred 
63. The question, in each case, will be whether an affirmative act of lawmaking is the 
"but for" cause of the injury. While the Supreme Court has recognized this aspect of the 
state action question in its decisions (see Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)), its 
approach to this inquiry has been erratic. Compare Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) 
with San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522 
(1987). 
64. 407 u.s. 163 (1972). 
65. ld. at 178-79. 
66. 334 U.S. I (1948). 
67. See Tribe, Constitutional Choices at 263 (cited in note 16). 
68. 436 u.s. 149 (1978). 
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even in the absence of the authorizing statute, 69 and the dissent of 
Justice Marshall which suggested that the governing background 
law, independent of the statute, would have prohibited that 
seizure. 1o The point in all these examples is that only a lawmaking 
act may violate the Constitution. A reprehensible exercise of power 
by an individual within a framework of unobjectionable law 
presents no constitutional question. 
Both of these exclusions emphasize that the posited definition 
of public action, put forward for the purpose of limiting the pre-
sumptive reach of the Constitution, turns on the unique character of 
the legislative power of the state: that power which the Constitution 
either created and defined, or recognized and limited. If the affirm-
ative misuse of that power represents the special risk against which 
the Constitution protects, it makes sense to distinguish between 
those acts which are genuinely the fruits of such abuse and those 
which merely coexist with it. Frank Goodman has captured the 
difference by distinguishing two different categories of what are con-
cededly "state authorized" actions, acting with permission and act-
ing by delegation: 
"What the state authorizes, the state does" may reflect a confu-
sion between two senses in which a state can be said to "author-
ize" private action: delegation and permission. When the state 
authorizes a private individual to perform some action on its be-
half-when, that is, it delegates the performance of a govern-
ment function-constitutional responsibility for that action rests 
essentially on agency principles. But when the state only permits 
69. "If New York had no commercial statutes at all, its courts would still be faceJ with 
the decision whether to prohibit or to permit the sort of sale threatened here the first time an 
aggrieved bailor came before them for relief." 436 U.S. at 165. The majority characterized 
the self-help seizure and sale in that case as part of "our system of property rights." I d. at 
162 n.11. At another point it claimed that "the crux of respondents' complaint is not that the 
State has acted, but that it has refused to act." ld. at 166 (emphasis in original). 
70. Justice Marshall cited numerous cases indicating that the execution of liens had 
been exclusively a function of the sheriff, 436 U.S. at 168. See also Choper, 1979 Wash. U. 
L.Q. at 775 (cited in note 39). In cases where a private person's acts can be justified on the 
basis of both a constitutionally valid and a constitutionally defective rule of law, the only 
question is whether pursuit of a legal remedy against the act is an appropriate context in 
which to review the problematic rule. Given the alternate basis for the action, such a case is 
arguably not "suitably structured litigation," see Tribe, Constitutional Choices at 265 (cited in 
note 16), to raise such action. To find unconstitutionality, a court must be in a situation 
where the challenged legislation determines the result. This would be the case where a party 
attacks the validity of a rule of law which is essential to a an opposing party's claim or 
defense. See, e.g., American Fed. of Laborv. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941); Tribe, Constitutional 
Choices at 255, 264 (cited in note 16). Most obviously, the rule could be challenged in a 
proper declaratory proceeding against the public officials who act on no basis other than the 
challenged rule. See Tribe, Constitutional Choices at 255 (cited in note 16). All of these 
alternatives put before the court the only constitutional question, the validity vel non of some 
act of lawmaking, not that of a non-legislating individual. 
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or allows (and, in that far weaker sense, "authorizes") private 
individuals to perform actions on their own behalf, the basis for 
attributing such action to the state is, to say the least, obscure.71 
349 
My point is not that permission may, in no way, be logically 
equated with state responsibility. It is only that the kind of state 
association raised by "permitted" action is recognizably different 
from that raised by "delegated" action. A sensible interpretation of 
the Constitution might extend the presumptive reach of its rules to 
the second rather than the first category of actions even though 
both might be "public" in some intrinsic sense. 
v 
The discussion in the last section was an attempt to show that, 
in spite of the conceptual barriers to maintaining the public-private 
distinction, it is possible to mark out a particular realm of actions to 
which the Constitution may be held to apply and outside of which it 
may not apply. That realm consists only of those affirmative ac-
tions taken in the exercise of, or solely as result of, the exercise of 
lawmaking power. That class of action may be called public for the 
purposes of constitutional adjudication. The decision to do so is, of 
necessity, an arbitrary one, in the sense that nothing in the nature of 
the actions themselves or of the legal system requires this result. 
Nonetheless, such a line is necessary if a clear difference between 
constitutional and ordinary law is to be preserved. 
While a later interpreter might simply impose such a limitation 
on a constitutional text, in the case of the United States Constitu-
tion the class of coverage suggested may be plausibly extracted from 
it as a matter of constitutional interpretation. I have already noted 
that there are some rules in the Constitution that, on their face, or 
by reasonable interpretation, may be applied to conduct that is 
outside that definition, either because they proscribe certain law-
making omissions or because they plainly refer to acts taken by an 
agent other than a lawmaker. Nevertheless, given the language of 
some provisions and the historical context of the enactment of al-
most all constitutional provisions, an interpretation that presump-
tively limits the reach of those rules to the affirmative use of the 
71. Frank I. Goodman, Professor Brest on State Action and Liberal Theory, and a Post-
script to Professor Stone, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1331, 1338 (1982) (emphasis added). My use of 
this distinction may be a bit different from Goodman's. That is because my focus is on the 
state's ability to legislate. I suggest the proper inquiry is whether or not the act in question is 
accurately characterized as nothing more than the execution of a constitutionally challengea-
ble act of legislation. 
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lawmaking power is usually, if not self-evident,n entirely plausible. 
It is hard to deny that the creators of the 1787 Constitution and the 
Bill of Rights appeared to be more concerned in that enterprise with 
the abuse of power by government than with that which might be 
worked by private individuals.73 Or, put another way, they were 
more concerned with preventing the government from acting in cer-
tain ways than in requiring the government to regulate the actions 
of individuals in certain ways. While the history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment with respect to the conduct of individuals, and the 
duty of government in that regard, is more controversial,74 there is 
ample evidence, in that case as well, that the principal concern was 
with restricting the capacity of states to implement a deliberate pol-
icy of discrimination. 1s 
Some commentators have argued, however, that the relative 
dangers from public and ostensibly private sources of power may be 
considerably different today than when the relevant constitutional 
provisions were enacted. Thus, it has been claimed that we now are 
subject to injuries from concentrated centers of non-governmental 
power (large corporations are the standard example) that were un-
known when the relevant constitutional provisions were enacted. 76 
At the same time, the influence of a governmental presence on os-
tensibly private decisions is no doubt considerably greater than at 
the time of constitutional drafting and enactment. It might, there-
fore, be more reasonable now to attribute injuries resulting from 
those decisions to the state. n 
It might be a sufficient response to these observations to say 
that we should be governed by the original and outdated vision of 
public and private power held by the constitution-makers, even if 
the relative dangers from state and non-state sources are markedly 
different today. Beyond this, however, I think it is possible to main-
tain the plausibility of the distinction between the state's responsi-
bility for the affirmative use of the lawmaking power and its 
responsibility for the actions that it might have, but did not, pro-
72. I have already noted that some academic commentators have argued, as a matter of 
history, that at least some categories of private conduct were meant to be regulated by the 
substantive rules of section one of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Heyman, 41 Duke 
L.J. 507 (cited in note 14); Soifer, 54 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 651 (cited in note 14). 
73. If the judgment of Chief Justice Marshall in Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 
243 (1833) is persuasive, this follows a fortiori. 
74. See, e.g., authorities cited in note 14, supra. 
75. See, e.g., Michael Les Benedict, A Compromise of Principle 169-70 (W.W. Norton, 
1974). 
76. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 510-11 (cited in note IS); Tushnet, 33 
N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. at 392-93 (cited in note 40); H.C. Macgill, Anomaly. Adequacy, and the 
Connecticut Constitution, 16 Conn. L. Rev. 681, 688-90, 697-99 (1984). 
77. See Bandes, 88 Mich. L. Rev. at 2292 (cited in note 8). 
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scribe. Even in the political and economic universe we inhabit to-
day, the injuries flowing from the former category might be thought 
a more attractive target for the clear and rigid kind of regulation 
which is the particular hallmark of constitutional law. 
One reason sometimes put forward to justify the drawing of 
such a line, however, is unpersuasive. That is the claim that re-
stricting the reach of the rules of the Constitution maintains an area 
of individual autonomy. It is true, as the Supreme Court noted in 
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., that the state action doctrine "pre-
serves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal 
law"?s if, by federal law, we mean only the Constitution. But it 
certainly does not limit the reach of federal statute law or of state 
law of any kind. In fact, by preventing the application and elucida-
tion of constitutional rules that might, themselves, result in an insis-
tence on individual autonomy in certain activities, it maintains an 
opportunity for ordinary legal regulation that a willingness to adju-
dicate the merits as a matter of constitutional law might have pre-
empted.79 
A defense of the limitation of the reach of the Constitution in 
the way suggested here requires a consideration of two issues. First, 
we need to ask whether there is a good reason for applying a consti-
tutional regime especially to exercises of the lawmaking authority 
and not to other sources of power in society. That done, it will still 
be necessary to justify the limitation of the application of constitu-
tional rules to the use of, as opposed to the failure to use, the law-
making authority. I have no intention here of demonstrating that 
this is the only, or even the best way to define the limits of constitu-
tional application. I hope only to show that the distinction drawn 
would be a reasonable means to that end in a society with our his-
tory and traditions. 
When we observe the character of a law-governed society, one 
in which the power of the state is principally exercised through the 
creation and enforcement of laws, the utility of a constitution spe-
cially designed to control lawmaking is evident. In an imagined 
ante-constitutional period, one where there is a legislative power but 
no constitution, the lawmaking power is, by definition, unlimited.so 
The American constitution-makers lived at a time, and in a place, 
where the emerging view of the state was that it presented the risk 
78. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982). 
79. See Tushnet, 33 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. at 397-98 (cited in note 40); Goodman, 130 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. at 1332-33 (cited in note 71). 
80. In the world today only the United Kingdom and New Zealand appear to fit this 
description. See Richard S. Kay, Comparative Constitutional Fundamentals, 6 Conn. I. Int'l. 
L. 445, 447, 447 n. 6 (1991). 
352 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 10:329 
of such an unlimited legislative power. Blackstone's Commentaries, 
published in the middle of the eighteenth century, cited Coke for 
the proposition that the jurisdiction of Parliament "is so transcen-
dent and absolute, that it cannot be confined either for causes or 
persons, within any bounds."8I "What they [the Parliament] do," 
Blackstone asserted, "no authority upon earth can undo. "82 It was, 
of course, the abuses of such an absolute concentration of power 
that spurred the colonists to revolution and they contested that om-
nipotence in theory as well as in arms. Although they sometimes 
premised the proper limits of the Parliament's authority on ideas of 
natural law or common law,83 by the time of the drafting of the 
Constitution the positivist conception of the state was sufficiently 
established that the constitution-makers thought the lawmaking 
power should be controlled by the establishment and articulation of 
a special and superior kind of positive law, one grounded in the 
supreme political authority of "the People. "84 
To a very significant extent, we share these conceptions of law 
and the state. For us, as for the Framers, there are no logical, in-
herent or pre-existing limits to the lawmaking power of the state.8s 
If this view predominates, it is plausible to see the state-in its ca-
pacity to make and enforce law-as a unique source of power and, 
therefore, as a unique center of danger. As an empirical matter, 
individuals may be faced with more serious threats from non-state 
sources, but the state as lawmaker is a source of power qualitatively 
different from any other in society (and, of course, the modem state 
is still, by any reckoning, a formidable source of worry). That is 
because it is by definition the only actor not subject to regulation by 
ordinary law.86 On this account it is reasonable to see the special 
81. I Blackstone's Commentan·es !56, citing Edward Coke, 4 Institutes 36. 
82. ld. 
83. See Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 68-69, 76-
79, 176-189 (Belknap Press, 1967). 
84. See Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 273-305, 372-89 (U. of 
N. Carolina Press, 1969). 
85. I believe this generalization to be largely accurate notwithstanding the recent surge 
in academic attention to theories of natural law. A useful discussion of some of the current 
literature is Philip Soper, Some Natural Confusions About Natural Law, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 
2393 (1992). Naturally there are practical limits to the authority of the state and these may 
be significant. I deal here only with the power of the state as defined by law. 
86. Cf. Alexander and Horton, Whom Does the Constitution Command? at 44-45 (cited 
in note 17); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 255 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
Only government requires to be constitutionally shackled to preserve the rights 
of the individual. Others, it is true, may offend against the rights of individuals. 
This is especially true in a world in which economic life is largely left to the private 
sector where powerful private institutions are not directly affected by democratic 
forces. But government can either regulate these or create distinct bodies for the 
protection of human rights and the advancement of human dignity. 
McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990) 3 S.C.R. 229, 262 (LaForest, J.). 
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function of the Constitution as providing a law for the lawmaker, a 
law for that power which would otherwise be lawless. 
It is for this reason that the two regimes of ordinary law and 
constitutional law should differ with respect to their subject matter. 
The ordinary law may reach any and every instance of human con-
duct. But, exactly because its potential reach is so extensive, the 
ordinary law needs to be subject to the second legal regime, that of 
the Constitution. It is perhaps an irony that the arguments against 
the limits created by the state action doctrine often focus on the fact 
that all ostensibly private conduct really has a public aspect since it 
might have been regulated by the state. It is exactly this otherwise 
omnipresent feature of ordinary law that demands the establish-
ment of constitutional law for the special and limited propose of 
controlling it. 
The lawmaking authority is a power that stands in need of re-
straint. It is built into our idea of a society controlled by the rule of 
law that the legislature ought not be left to control itself. We pre-
sume that every human agency is subject to the defects of character 
that underlie the dictum of Lord Coke in Dr. Bonham's Case that 
no person may properly judge his or her own case,s7 and it is the 
unstated but essential premise of Marshall's judgment in Marbury v. 
Madison. Given the breadth and variety of the jurisdiction of the 
ordinary lawmaking regime, the injuries it might inflict are endless 
and, critically, the apparent justifications of public policy for such 
actions will often appear to have compelling force. Therefore, it 
makes sense to chart out with special clarity and special perma-
nence the rules for exercising that power. The peculiar contribution 
a constitution makes to social well-being is the security it affords 
that the restless and threatening power of the state will be confined 
within knowable boundaries. 
This picture of the relative roles of the separate regimes of or-
dinary and of constitutional law portrays a society in which every 
exercise of power but one is theoretically amenable to rule by law. 
For conduct generally, it is by the medium of the ordinary rules of 
law promulgated by lawmakers acting according to procedures, and 
within substantive limits, prescribed by the Constitution. For the 
force of lawmakers, it is by application of the rules of the Constitu-
tion especially created for that purpose. The only action not subject 
to legal control is the creation of the Constitution by the constituent 
power. 
This fairly familiar picture of a legal system supports the lim-
87. 80 Co. Rep. 107a, 113b, 77 Eng. Rep. 638, 646 (1610). 
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ited application of the rules of the Constitution to lawmaking and 
actions possible only because of some act of lawmaking, as de-
scribed in the previous section. But it is necessary to explain one 
further feature of that model: its limitation to affirmative exercises 
of the lawmaking power as opposed to failures to exercise that 
power. 
This further restriction may, in the first instance, reflect practi-
cal doubts about the effective capacity of law. A broader reading of 
the Constitution would necessarily require the state to undertake 
certain affirmative duties.ss The legal elaboration and enforcement 
of such duties plainly presents a less manageable task than the inter-
pretation and enforcement of mere prohibitions. The greater diffi-
culty of effecting action than inaction by the use of legal rules is one 
of the explanations sometimes offered for the courts' reluctance to 
find liability from mere nonfeasance.s9 Anglo-American courts of 
equity, moreover, have often shown an entirely practical reluctance 
to order affirmative performances.90 
It is true that some commentators have made serious argu-
ments for interpreting the Constitution as imposing "welfare" du-
ties on govemments.9t But the experience in other countries where 
such affirmative rights have been codified or considered, further re-
inforces the idea that such an enterprise could create serious practi-
cal difficulties. The guarantees of affirmative welfare rights in 
socialist constitutions may easily be dismissed as shams.92 In na-
tions which are genuinely committed to active government support 
of social welfare, but which also take their constitutions more seri-
ously, the constitution-makers have foregone the attempt to assure 
the preferred social policies by creating enforceable constitutional 
rules. Thus, while the Indian Constitution contains a set of "direc-
tive principles of state policy," those principles are explicitly ex-
88. See text at note 8 supra. 
89. Jerome Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 191 (Bobbs-Merrill, 2d ed. 1960). 
The distinction between nonfeasance and malfeasance is also discussed infra at text at notes 
100-106. 
90. John M. Pomeroy, 4 A Treatise on Equity Jun'sprudence, §§ 1337-38 at 934-35 
(1941). 
91. See Frank I. Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of "Sover-
eignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 Yale L.J. 1165 (1977); Laurence H. Tribe, 
Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essen-
tial Government Services, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1065 (1977). 
92. See John N. Hazard, Soviet Socialism and the Duty to Rescue, in Kurt H. 
Nadelmann et a!., eds., XXth Century Comparative and Conflicts Law: Legal Essays in Honor 
of Hessel E. Yntema 160-71 (A.W. Sytholf-Leyden, 1961); 01impiad S. lotTe, Soviet Law and 
Soviet Reality 52-56, 119-20, 146-56 (Martin us Nijholf Pubs., 1985); Shirley Raissi Bysiewicz 
and Louise 1. Shelly, Women in the Soviet Economy: Proclamations and Practice in Olimpiad 
S. lotTe and Mark W. Janis, eds., Soviet Law and Economy 51-71 (Martinus Nijholf Pubs., 
1987). 
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eluded from judicial enforcement.93 In the last (failed) attempt to 
make substantial changes in the Canadian constitution, there was at 
one point a widely supported proposal for a "social charter" in 
which the government would ensure adequate health care, educa-
tion, social services and environmental protection. In the final 
agreement, however, this was watered down to a series of bland 
"objectives," which the accord stated "should not be justiciable."94 
These experiences, while not universal,9s attest that a judgment that 
some things are not suitable for the unusually strict and permanent 
form of law that is associated with constitutions and constitutional 
adjudication is, at least, a reasonable one. 
Beyond these practical problems, the distinction asserted rests 
on a plausible judgment that the injuries suffered as a result of the 
affirmative actions may be distinctly severe in contrast with those 
caused by inaction. One commentator has suggested that there can 
be something particularly repellant about suffering that can be at-
tributed to some affirmative action of the state. In a democratic 
society every citizen has the right to regard the state as acting, in a 
general sense, on his or her behalf. Injuries that are caused by deci-
sions solely traceable to a grant of public power represent a betrayal 
of trust in a way that is not the case when the triggering decision is 
made by an individual acting entirely in his or her own interest.96 It 
is true, of course, that for all the reasons mentioned the state is in 
93. Constitution of India, Part IV (1989) in 7 Constitutions of the Countries of the World 
62 (Albert P. Blaustein and Gilbert H. Flanz, eds., Oceana Pub., 1990). 
94. Consensus Report on the Constitution, part B.4, Final Text, Charlottetown, August 
28, 1992. Available in Quicklaw Computer Service, CDC Database. 
95. I do not mean that constitutions can never impose affirmative duties. I have already 
noted that in places the United States Constitution does just that, see text at notes 11-12, 
supra. Furthermore, the German Constitutional Court has held that the German constitu· 
tion has an influence on private law rules and, as a consequence, that the courts are obliged to 
recognize certain rights of action for violations of constitutional rights by both the state and 
private parties. See Quint, 48 Md. L. Rev. at 280, 314-15 (cited in note 7). Similarly, that 
Court has held that the Basic Law's reference to a "right to life" imposed a duty on the state 
to provide criminal penalties for abortion. See Walter F. Murphy and Joseph Tanenhaus, 
Comparative Constitutional Law: Cases and Materials, 422-29 (St. Martin's Press, 1977). De-
spite (or perhaps in response to) this constitutional background, a parliamentary committee 
charged with formulating proposals for constitutional revision in light of German reunifica-
tion has recently rejected the suggested incorporation of constitutional "social goals" includ-
ing education, social security and environmental protection. German Group Rejects 
Constitution for Social Rights, The Reuter Library Report, February 12, 1993. The Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights has interpreted Article 8 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights, which declares the "right to respect for private and family life" to impose a 
"positive obligation" to provide the necessary legal preconditions to the enjoyment of family 
and private life. See, e.g., Case of X and Y v. The Netherlands, Judgment of 26 March, 1985 
(Series A. No. 91), 8 E.H.R.R. 235. 
96. Barbara Rook Snyder, Private Motivation, State Action and the Allocation of Re-
sponsibility for Founeenth Amendment Violations, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 1053, 1061-62 (1990). 
See also Monroe v. Pope, 365 U.S. 167, 254-55 (1967) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
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some way "responsible" for the individual decisions as well. But 
the feeling of abuse from the mere failure to protect one's interests 
is less severe than that sensed when the harm results from a direct 
action. That is because, as an empirical matter, the direct action is 
more often an intentional one. "Even a dog," Holmes noted, "dis-
tinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked. "97 
The critical role of an imputed intention may be present in the 
more general legal recognition of a difference between injury caused 
by action and injury caused by omission. The common law has, for 
centuries, taken account of this difference in drawing a distinction 
between misfeasance and nonfeasance. To use the standard exam-
ple, there is no duty to go to the rescue of a drowning stranger even 
if the attempt involves no risk to the would-be rescuer. In such 
cases there is no liability in either criminal or tort law.9s It is true 
that exceptions to the exemption from liability for nonfeasance have 
been increasingly common. Courts and commentators have persua-
sively demonstrated that acts and omissions may be equally effec-
tive agents of injury99 and, indeed, the very difference between acts 
and omissions has been shown to be sometimes obscure.1oo In spite 
of this assault, however, the distinction is "firmly entrenched in 
American law" and it still represents the "undisputed general rule 
under both the criminal law and tort law" against which a special 
case for liability must be argued. WI It continues, moreover, to be 
found in judgments of common law courts.102 
The persistence of this distinction in the face of cogent criti-
cisms suggests that it reflects a basis for characterization that still 
has some recognizable appeal. It might be attributed to a felt differ-
ence between the blameworthiness of the person who has acted and 
that of the person who has failed to act. The latter's behavior is 
more often explained by inadvertence or carelessness, while the af-
97. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law 7 (Mark DeWolfe Howe, ed., Belknap 
Press, 1963). 
98. See generally, W. Page Keeton eta!., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 373-85 
(West Pub. Co., 5th ed. 1984). 
99. See H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honore, Causation in the Law 127-28 (Clarendon Press, 
2d ed. 1985); Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law at 196-98 (cited in note 89). 
100. See Hart and Honore, Causation in the Law at 138-39 (cited in note 99); Keeton et 
a!., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts at 374-75 (cited in note 98); Bandes, 88 Mich. L. 
Rev. at 2281-82 (cited in note 8). 
101. Susan J. Hoffman, Note, Statutes Establishing a Duty to Report Crimes or Render 
Assistance to Strangers: Making Apathy Criminal, 72 Ky. L.J. 827, 829 (1984) citing Model 
Penal Code § 2.01(3) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) and Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 314 (1977). 
102. See, e.g., Lewis v. Razzberries Inc., 222 Ill. App. 3d 843, 584 N.E.2d 437 (1991) 
(failure of tavern owner to provide escort through parking lot not negligence); Billingslea v. 
State, 734 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (failure to provide medical care to elderly 
mother, absent statutory duty, creates no criminal responsibility). 
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firmative actor is more likely to have acted intentionally. 103 Thus 
the Supreme Court in Lugar defended the state action doctrine as 
preventing the imposition on a state of "responsibility for conduct 
for which [it] cannot fairly be blamed." It would be unreasonable, 
however, to think that the creators of constitutional rules were mo-
tivated, in this respect, by notions of moral desert. But, for similar 
reasons, one might conclude that affirmative actions of the state are 
not only more reprehensible, they are also more risky than omis-
sions. The harms that follow on a state's failure to act are, in a 
sense, happenstance. In the usual case no official person will have 
planned for those results to follow. Affirmative acts, on the other 
hand, are more likely to have been deliberate and, therefore, they 
are more likely to have been undertaken with a dangerous state of 
mind. They pose the hazard not merely of the injuries that follow 
in the particular instance but of a course of conduct which portends 
even greater harm. This need not be so in every case, but it is a 
reasonable enough assumption to explain why the state may be 
thought more threatening when it acts than when it fails to act.I04 
While these empirical differences between action and inaction 
may be less than compelling, they nonetheless provide a plausible 
basis on which to ground a limiting definition of the scope of the 
Constitution. They support as reasonable a conclusion that the gen-
erality of citizens have more to fear from the positive employment 
of the unique lawmaking power of the state than from the withhold-
ing of that power. Perhaps most significantly, however, the applica-
tion of the Constitution to lawmaking omissions as well as acts 
would, for reasons already discussed, blur the critical distinction 
between the ordinary legal regime designed to govern individual 
conduct and the special regime of constitutional law to restrain the 
exercise of the lawmaking power. That is because, as noted, to in-
sist on the affirmative exercise of the lawmaking power to effectuate 
constitutionally desired results is tantamount to direct constitu-
tional regulation of the subjects of lawmaking. It is to impose a 
103. See David G. Owen, Civil Punishment and the Public Good, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 103, 
108 (1982) ("While on occasion a defendant's failure to energize his power to protect the 
plaintiff may be flagrant and extreme, his purposeful activation and release of that power 
physically upon the plaintiff will more often involve the kind of existential choice for which 
punishment is in order.") Cf. Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law at 208 (cited in note 
89). 
104. Reasoning like this has been said to underlie the continuing distinction in medical 
ethics between active and passive decisions to allow a terminally ill person to die. See Presi· 
dent's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Be-
havioral Research, Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment: A Report on the Ethical, 
Medical and Legal Issues in Treatment Decisions, 66-68, 72-73 (1983) (Reprinted by Concern 
for Dying Educational Council). 
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duty on the state to assure that all conduct conforms to the substan-
tive standards of the Constitution. That duty would presumably be 
enforceable by constitutional litigation. Given the broad and exten-
sive duties concededly imposed on the state by such provisions as 
those in section one of the Fourteenth Amendment, the necessity of 
determining that duty in individual cases, and the requirements of 
framing of judicial relief for failure to execute it, the result would be 
a near coincidence of the fields of ordinary and constitutional law. 
It would, therefore, restore the problem that caused us to seek a 
narrower scope for constitutional law in the first place. 
VI 
It is necessary, in conclusion, to make clear the limited nature 
of the arguments made in this paper. There is nothing inherent in 
the idea of a constitution that makes it incapable of application to 
private conduct or of imposing affirmative duties on the state. In 
fact, it is likely that the United States Constitution has rules with 
exactly that effect. What I have suggested is a presumptive rule of 
interpretation for those provisions which are phrased as prohibi-
tions and which refer in express terms to the states or federal gov-
ernment, as well as for those which omit such reference but which, 
in the context in which they were created, are best understood as 
having been directed at such governments. These rules, of course, 
account for a very significant part of the Constitution. My differ-
ence is with those commentators who think that even these provi-
sions must be interpreted to apply directly to private persons or to 
require government to act affirmatively in some way. They argue 
that the restriction of the rules to some more limited field of "public 
action" cannot be justified as a matter of sound constitutional policy 
or, worse, relies on a distinction that is incoherent and thus unsus-
tainable.tos I have argued that neither of these arguments is 
persuasive. 
In addition to the practical justifications outlined, this ap-
proach to Constitutional application is, I think, supportable as a 
matter of interpretation. Of course, such an interpretive judgment 
does not put the issue beyond debate. A decision to adhere to the 
discovered meaning of a legal text is itself open to a challenge and 
rests on a normative choice. That is the choice to limit collective 
power by application of rigid, a priori rules. This is not the place to 
defend this profoundly controvertible judgment. That general deci-
sion and the more specific one to adhere to the historical limits of 
105. See, e.g. Cbemerinsky, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 503 (cited in note 15); Bandes, 88 Mich. 
L. Rev. 2271 (cited in note 8). 
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the Constitution are surely open to impeachment on grounds of pol-
icy and political theory. I have elsewhere explained why I think a 
submission to the historical judgments of constitution-makers may 
be justified notwithstanding its obvious costs.J06 The particular 
costs of the rather modest version of the Constitution I have out-
lined here are also plain. Since it leaves the bulk of human conduct 
to be regulated at the discretion of the ordinary lawmaker, it ex-
poses people to the risks of an inadequate response by that 
lawmaker to a multitude of evils inflicted by individuals, economic 
circumstances or the forces of nature. Where the rules of the Con-
stitution might be construed as prohibiting such evils, to accept 
such a narrow application is to countenance wrongs which a more 
expansive view of the Constitution might have prevented or 
remedied. 
The prospect of applying the standards of the Constitution to 
conduct beyond the lawmaking power can, therefore, be an attrac-
tive one. It is consistent with that phenomenon identified by Henry 
Monaghan as the "perfect constitution." Holders of this view see 
the Constitution as having been "assigned the function of defining 
the American way of life, both descriptively and prescriptively."J07 
The impulse to see the Constitution as an instrument for the solu-
tion for a wide array of old and new social problems is evident in 
much of the literature dealing with the public-private distinction 
and the state action doctrine. Thus, Charles Black's influential at-
tack on the state action doctrine in 1967 was premised on what he 
saw as that doctrine's inhibiting influence on the willingness of 
courts to contribute to the struggle against racial injustice: 
Racism, including that formally "private" racism that blots 
so much of public life, is not only a national problem but the 
national problem. The racism problem, in law, is now princi-
pally the "state action" problem; to be slow to recognize state 
action, to complicate the concept with unwarranted limiting 
technicalities, is to confirm racism pro tanto. 10s 
In a similar vein, Susan Bandes has noted that the failure to read 
the Constitution as imposing affirmative duties has resulted in seri-
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ous "flesh and blood consequences," including the failure to provide 
a remedy for a child victim of parental abuse and the absence of 
public funding of abortions for Medicaid recipients.I09 The fact 
that this constitutional interpretation "permits so many harms to 
flourish unchecked," she argues, means that such a reading should 
be carefully reconsidered. 110 Erwin Chemerinsky is clear in his ar-
gument for abandoning the state action doctrine altogether. His 
reading would allow "the Constitution [to] be viewed as a code of 
social morals, not just of governmental conduct." III 
This way of looking at the Constitution conceives it as a means 
for the achievement of evolving social goals and not merely as the 
specification of a set of defined rules. The authors of one of the 
most thorough and intelligent studies of the reach of the Constitu-
tion take for granted that the determination of the Constitution's 
proper scope turns, in part, on the extent to which the alternatives 
maximize "constitutional values." 112 Such a definition of the con-
stitutional enterprise might well lead to the recognition of a wider 
field for constitutional adjudication. In this respect, as in others, 
however, such an approach sacrifices the special virtues of a regime 
of fixed rules. With respect to the questions at issue here, the fixed 
rules of the historical constitution facilitate the confident division of 
the risks of social intercourse. No system of law can eliminate those 
risks altogether, nor would we wish it to. By singling out a know-
able set of special dangers for rigid constitutional proscription, the 
Constitution makes the social world at least a little more managea-
ble. I have already observed how a more ambitious view of consti-
tutional application, especially combined with more flexible 
methods of substantive constitutional interpretation, promises to 
transform constitutional adjudication into an ever-changing judicial 
supervision of almost all social relations. Whatever the substantive 
advantages that such a system may yield, they do not include the 
security that may be derived from the existence of stable and know-
able limits on the power of the state. In the wide universe of social 
needs that may be a small benefit, but it is one peculiarly appropri-
ate for a system of law. 
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